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SUMMARY During the last decade the decrease in the size
of computing machinery, coupled with the increase in their comp~ting powe: has lend to the development of the concept of mo?I1e comput.m~. Effects of this new vision is currently evident
m the flourIshmg numbers of mobile telephones and portable
computing units. In this paper we briefly investigate some issues
concerning the security of mobile computing systems, within the
framework of the categories of mobility, disconnection, data access modes and scale of operation (Imielinski & Badrinath, 1993).
In contrast to previous works which concentrate on security in
wIreless communications, we focus on the security of interactions
which are built upon the underlying wireless communications
medium. Some conclusions are presented on the future directions for security research in mobile computing systems.
key words: information security

1.

Introduction

The birth of "mobile computing" has signalled a new
era in the field of computing and information systems.
The concept of mobile computing is derived from the
realization that as computing machinery decrease in size
and increase in computing power users will demand
these machinery to be part of their everyday life, accompanying them in the carrying-out of their everyday
tasks. Researchers in this new field envisage that mobile computing units, such as today's laptops and palmtops, in the future will be communicating with each
other via wireless networks, whilst providing location
~ransp~rency to the user. This notion of transparency
IS carned-over from that in distributed computing, in
which the user is unaware of the remote physical location of the resources being used by the distri buted computing system. In the case of mobile computing, however, several differences emerge. The major differenceand in contrast to distributed computing-is precisely
the mobility or the non-fixed positioning of some of the
computing elements. This difference in itself presents
various new challenges to researchers in the field.
The growing interest in mobile computing as a real
possibility for the future has been driven partly by the
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popularity of mobile telephone systems, which to a certain extent has increased the desire on the part of the
users to have computing available in a similarly mobile
manner. The nomadic nature of some mobile computing elements have introduced new problems which were
non-existent in the traditional areas of computing. New
solutions and solutions derived from traditional computing are in demand in order to transform the dreams
of mobile computing into a reality.
In the notable work of [2J, four categories for future developments in mobile wireless computing have
been proposed, namely mobility, disconnection, data access modes and scale of operation. These areas present
challenges to the traditional approach to distributed
computing, which until recently have not included effects of mobility into their design and applications. In
this paper we would like to propose security as being
the fifth category which intersects the four categories.
Similar to the early research efforts during the last two
decades in the area of traditional computing systems,
currently much emphasis have been placed on deriving
solutions which provide for acceptable performance and
availability, with little stress on the need of security in
such solutions.
Unlike previous works which concentrate on communications security in wireless networks [3J, [4J such
as the European GSM or U.S Digital Cellular (USDC),
here we wish to focus more on the security of interactions which are built upon the underlying wireless
communications medium. Each of the four categories
of[2J introduces differing levels and ranges of security
requirements, and in this paper we will briefly discuss
some security issues within the framework of these categories. The current work is not aimed at providing a
comprehensive investigation into all aspects of security
within the mobile computing environment. Rather, this
paper aims at identifying the broad areas within mobile
computing which are likely to have immediate security
concerns, and it hopes to provide some pointers as to
the direction for future research in mobile computing
security.
For simplicity and generality, we will use the terms
Mobile Unit (MU) for the users and their portable computing unit, Mobile Support Station (MSS) for the stations which maintain communications with the mobile
units and Fixed Host for the other nodes connected to
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The mobile computing network and its components (after[IJ).

-MSS: Mobile Support Station
LS: Locarion Server
MU: Mobile Unit

Fig. 2

Location servers in the mobile network.

the mobile support stations [I]. The basic network architecture is shown in Fig. l. In addition, Location
Servers (LS) are employed to keep track of the position and actions of each mobile unit. Hence, a given
location server holds a database containing information
about a mobile unit registered as having a "home-base"
in the area or zone managed by the location server and
about visitors in the area (cell). These location sever
databases are used to manage and operate the mobile

wireless network [5J, and as such, they are not directly
accessible to the mobile units. The data stored in these
database are used and inter-exchanged only among location servers, and between location servers and mobile
support stations (Fig. 2). The location servers typically
correspond to mobile switching offices, with approximately 60 to 100 mobile support stations being catered
for by one location server [6J
In the next section we discuss the security issues
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pertaining to the mobility factor in mobile computing.
This is followed in Sect. 3 with a discussion on the effects of disconnections on security. This followed by
security issues relating to the new access modes within
mobile computing in Sect. 4 and scale in Sect. 5. Finally, Sect. 6 closes the paper with some remarks and
conclusions.

2.

Mobility and Security

The fact that both users and the data that they carry
have become a mobile component in computing has in
itself introduced a set of security problems different to
that in traditional computing. In the traditional case of
fixed (non-mobile) computing physical protection could
easily be afforded by making a computer and database
system physically isolated from the other components in
the environment. In such a configuration it was possible to make the system self-sufficient, without any need
to communicate with the external world. More recent
firewall techniques may also be applied to achieve the
same effect.
In mobile computing this form of isolation and
self-sufficiency is difficult to achieve due the relatively
limited resources available to a mobile unit, thereby necessitating it to communicate with the mobile support
station. The mobility of users and the data that they
carry introduces security problems from the point of
view of the existence and location of a user (which is
deemed to be data in themselves) and from the point of
view the privacy and authenticity of the data exchanged
between users and between a user and a fixed host. More
specifically, a user on a mobile wireless network may
choose to have the information concerning his or her
existence treated as being confidential. That is, a user
may choose to remain anonymous to the majority of
other users on the network, with the exception of a select number with whom the user often interacts.
This problem of user anonymity in mobile computing is related to a more difficult problem of the trust
level afforded by each node in the wireless network and
the problem of the security of location data concerning
a user when the location data is stored or transferred
between nodes as the user moves in a nomadic fashion.
These nodes must provide some assurance to the user
about his or her anonymity, independent of the differing levels of trust that may exist for each node. This
requirement is of particular importance in the case of
a user that crosses between two zones which are under two nodes respectively, each having a different trust
level. Equally important is the secure transfer of data
between databases at nodes which hold location data
and other information or parameters in the user profile.
Here all traffic internal to the network and transparent
to the nomadic user must be maintained private and authentic. Any notion of trust in this case must be clearly
expressed and formulated (such as that in [7J), and new

formulations may be required specifically for security in
the mobile computing environment.
Another potential security problem lies in the possibility of information leakage through the inference
made by an attacker masquerading as a mobile support
station with or without the aid of a subverted mobile
support station. The attacker which masquerades as a
mobile support station may issue a number of queries
to the database at the user's home node or to database
at other nodes, with the aim of deducing parts of the
user profile containing the patterns and history of the
user's movements. Here again, security techniques are
required both for the databases and for the identification of users and mobile support stations. Any scheme
to be used must ensure that any queries submitted to a
given database at a user's home-base is accompanied by
sufficient proof that the user approves of the queries submitted by the (foreign) mobile support station controlling the zone under which the user is currently roaming
or passing through. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to
assume that some method of delegation of rights [8J will
be employed between the user and the mobile support
stations (and fixed hosts) in the network.
Related to the management of these databases and
the provision of performance transparency [6J for the
nomadic user is the issue of the replication of certain
parameters and user profiles with the aim of replicating
the environments surrounding the user. Thus, as the
user roams across zones, the user must not experience a
degradation in the access and latency times. Such degradations will reduce the mobile unit response time to the
user, and thus affect the work of the user. Reasonable
response times must be maintained to provide mobility
transparency to the user. Again, security must be considered in the context of replication, both from the trust
level of the mobile support stations and fixed hosts and
from the point of view of data leakage. In general, as
sensitive data is replicated across several sites, the security risks are also increased due to the multiplication of
the points of attack [9].

3.

Security in Disconnections

Another major issue in mobile computing which arises
from mobility and power (battery) restrictions is disconnections. The disconnection of a mobile unit from a
mobile support station is necessary for the conservation
of power of the mobile unit. A mobile unit can typically
find itself running on a temporary form of power supply (e.g. spare battery) while its main power source is
being recovered (ie. recharged). In this situation differing levels of disconnection may be introduced, ranging
from the normal connection to connections using low
bandwidth channels.
A crucial aspect of disconnection is the elective or
non-elective nature of a disconnection [2]. The nonelective disconnection refers to the cases when a mo-
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bile unit disconnects due to an unforeseen event, such
as system crashes or total communications break-down
when moving into certain geographic regions. The elective disconnection refers to the user who deliberately
chooses or elects to disconnect. That is, the planned
and desired disconnection on the part of the owner of
the mobile unit who wishes to temporarily limit remote
access to his or her mobile unit. This type of disconnection typically covers instances where power availability
is degrading, where the owner wishes to employ the
maximum resources (e.g. CPU) available for a short
task, or where the owner simply desires the mobile unit
to be put into a "sleep" state.
In both types of disconnections, a number of potential security loop-holes may be introduced. The transition from one level of disconnection to another may
present an opportunity for an attacker to masquerade either the mobile unit or the mobile support station. Any
disconnection transition scheme must ensure that an attacker cannot mimic the mobile unit and then present
the mobile support station with a false cancellation
command with regard to the disconnection. That is,
an attacker should not be able to "hi-jack" the communications of a mobile unit which is stepping-down its
level of connection and then masquerading as the mobile unit. Similarly, an attacker must not masquerade as
a mobile support station to a mobile unit that is about
to step-up its level of connection.
One possible sol ution to this problem is for the mobile unit and the mobile support station to agree upon
a secret before any transition in the levels of elective
disconnections. When at a later time the mobile unit
wishes to upgrade the connection level with the mobile
support station, both parties can start by exchanging the
shared secret in a secure manner. A good candidate for
a solution to this problem is zero-knowledge protocols,
in which the mobile unit and the mobile support station
can convince each other that they hold the shared secret
without having to transmit the full secret [10]. Other
schemes based on smartcards may also be a good candidate (e.g. [IIJ).
Another potential security problem related to disconnections is the leaking of information through the
use of inappropriate concurrency control techniques
in the database of the mobile unit. During the past
few years research work in the area of secure concurrency control techniques have indicated that covert
channels exist in many standard concurrency control
algorithms[12J,[13]. A covert channel is created in
multilevel database systems when one user can indirectly control the abort/commit patterns exhibited by
the transaction scheduler. These patterns are then experienced by other transactions belonging to a second
user. In this manner, the first user can leak data to the
second user who may not actually have access to the
data readable by the first user. If a database in a mobile unit is to be accessible by a remote user in the form

of the remote user submitting small transactions, then
the potential for covert channels will exist unless the
mobile unit employs a suitable and secure concurrency
control algorithm.
Related to this issue is the problem of incomplete
transactions caused by elective and non-elective disconnections. A number of scenarios present themselves in
this context. Security and integrity problems may occur in the case when hand-oft's occur between two mobile support stations as the mobile unit crosses zones
(cells). Other security problem may occur when a mobile unit deposits a "timed" transaction at a fixed-node,
which begins to execute when certain conditions are met
(e.g. time of day, availability of raw data) and which
transmits the results back to the nomadic mobile unit.
These scenarios represent only a few potential security
problems among many others in the context of levels of
disconnections and transaction management in mobile
computing.

4.

Secure Data Access Methods

One of the advantages of mobile communications derives from the possible use of broadcasting techniques
to provide services to varying sizes of audience groups
(users) with minimal change in the delivery cost of the
services. The work of [14] identifies two methods of
delivering information to the mobile unit of users by
a broadcast server, namely through data broadcasting
and interactive requests. The possibility of continuous
broadcasting of ever-changing data lends to the attractive notion of data broadcasting being a public form
of "memory", where mobile units periodically refresh
their limited memories (caches) using "data on the air".
Two important parameters related to the broadcasting of data are access time and tuning time, the first
referring to the time taken for a reply to be received
by a client (mobile unit) from the broadcast server, the
later referring to the amount of time taken by the client
in "listening" to the channel in order to obtain the selected data. Here, the mobile unit will first listen to an
"index channel" that delivers a directory related to the
broadcasted data, then it will proceed to use the directory information as a guide as to when the mobile unit
should access the stream of data. Ideally, the mobile
unit should remain in "doze" mode until the required
data is being broadcasted, at which time it should automatically wake itself up from this mode. Such a scenario
is within reach of today's technology (with the minor
exception of the battery technology that must stilI be
improved). However, there are a number of issues related to the privacy, authenticity and integrity of the
broadcasted data that need to be addressed and solved.
The first and foremost is the authentication of the
source of the broadcast (e.g. broadcast server) by the
mobile units. Since such a broadcast may carry public
data whose accuracy is paramount (e.g. stock exchange
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data) and whose authority for publication (e.g. NYSE)
is accepted by the community, source authentication
and integrity becomes crucial as minor inaccuraciesaccidental or deliberate-may result in great losses on
the part of the users. Therefore, methods are needed for
initial source authentication by the mobile units, and
for the periodic source re-authentication by the mobile
units in such a way that it consumes less power than
the initial authentication. Such methods would be attractive if they use (cryptographic) parameters which
are embedded within the stream of broadcast data and
which are recognizable at a given time only by the mobile units that require to perform re-authentication at
that time. This will also lend to the ability of targeting re-authentication procedures for different groups of
users (mobile units) at different moments in time.
Together with source authentication comes the
need to maintaining the integrity of the broadcast data
stream. Here, a number of possible attack scenarios
present themsel ves, one being the denial of service attack
ranging from crude channel interference to the sophisticated modifications of the index channel resulting in
the mobile unit listening to incorrect (useless or undesirable) parts of the broadcast stream. More sophisticated
attacks may even attempt to substitute segments from
both the index channel and the data stream in such a
way that the mobile unit is unaware of the attack.
The notion of a continuous broadcast of data being
a public "memory" [14J together with the limited physical memory (cache) available at the mobile unit leads
to the important issue of trust accorded by the users
to the source of broadcast. Since the "public memory" will become a fleeting entity of a short lifetime,
accountability of the source and the auditability of the
broadcast data becomes necessary to prevent fraud when
the broadcasted data carries commercial value and has
commercial impact on its recipients.

5.

Scaling Security

The specific issues relating to security increases in complexity as various components within the mobile network increase in number and in their mode of interaction. The increase in the number of mobile units and
their wider geographic distribution across regional and
political boundaries will result in the need for new solutions specific to mobile computing. The potential for
the proliferation of mobile units may result in the need
for increase in the size and capacity of the infrastructure
supporting the network.
With the increase in number and geographic distribution of mobile units, some basic security functional ities will be required to be provided by the Mobile Support Stations and Location Servers. Examples of these
functionalities include large scale key distribution and
key management solutions, the provision of secrecy and
authentication across large geographic boundaries with

minimal delay, and the secure management of parts of
the mobile network which are under different management bodies (national and international). International
security policies to regulate trans-border data flows will
also need to be established as nomadic mobile units
wander in and out of countries and sensitive regions.
Currently a number of solutions exist in the area
of distributed computing systems for the provision of
security in a globalized computing environment. Hierarchical key generation, distribution and management
techniques already exist which are aimed for the traditional stationary computing systems [15J, [16]. Extensions to these techniques for the mobile environment
may be a first step towards satisfying the security needs
of mobile computing. However, new solutions will also
need to be designed and implemented if security is to
scale properly in the mobile network.

6.

Remarks and Conclusion

There is still a long way for research to proceed before
mobile computing will become a daily reality in society.
Although considerable effort is being focused towards
research in mobile computing, much of it is concentrating on the performance and availability of mobile computing. with comparatively little attention being given
to the security issues in such an environment.
In this paper we have proposed security to be a
major category for future developments in mobile computing. We have discussed briefly the issues of security
in the context of mobility, disconnection and data access
methods, presenting a number of potential problems in
the security of a mobile computing environment.
The mobile computing environment and its security
presents a new ground for further research, with some
problems which are non-existent in the traditional nonmobile computing environment. Future work on the
security of mobile computing must address the problems pertaining to the security of information within
the three sub-areas of the mobile environment:
• The security of information residing in the mobile
units, and the correctness and integrity of data in
these mobile units.
• The security of information as it travels "over the
air" between mobile units and mobile support stations. An important consideration in this area
is the power consumption of the algorithms and
schemes that implement this secure data transfer.
New secure data storage schemes and data organization techniques will be required to facilitate
rapid searching and transfer of data to and from
mobile units.
• The security of information within the mobile
wireless network. This includes the security of
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databases holding control data used for the operations and management of the mobile wireless
network.
These three sub-areas of research will be crucial if mobile computing is to be a reality in the future.
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